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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS article reviews judicial and legislative developments in Texas
law related to electric and natural gas utilities from January 1, 2003
through November 1, 2003. The cases examined include decisions
of courts of the State of Texas. The majority of the significant cases dis-
cussed in this article focus on the interpretation and implementation of
statutes and rules relating to the deregulation of the electric utility indus-
try in Texas.
II. ELECTRIC UTILITY CASES
A. OVERVIEW OF DEREGULATION OF THE TEXAS
ELECTRICITY MARKET
In 1975, the Texas Legislature enacted the Public Utility Regulatory
Act ("PURA") in order to "establish a comprehensive and adequate reg-
* B.S., Texas A&M University, 1995; J.D., University of Texas, 2000. Associate,
Thompson & Knight, L.L.P., Austin.
SMU LAW REVIEW
ulatory system for electric utilities to assure rates, operations, and ser-
vices that are just and reasonable to the consumers and to the electric
utilities."' The PURA created a state agency to regulate utilities, the
Public Utility Commission of Texas ("PUC"). The PUC set rates for elec-
tric utilities with the objective of providing utilities an opportunity to earn
a reasonable rate of return on their invested capital and recover reasona-
bly incurred expenses, subject to their provision of just and reasonable
rates to retail customers.
In 1999, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 7 to deregulate the
electric generation market and permit certain electricity providers to
compete for customers. Senate Bill 7 amended the PURA and provided
for a transition period from a regulated to a deregulated system. Senate
Bill 7 included provisions ensuring that Texas electric customers will re-
ceive lower prices and better service in a competitive market.
Under the regulated electric system, a single utility generated electric-
ity, built and maintained the electricity distribution grid, and sold electric-
ity to consumers. In the deregulated market, those three functions are
"unbundled" into three separate entities: power generation companies,
transmission and distribution utilities, and retail electric providers
("REPs").2 The REPs sell the power generated by the power generation
companies through the distribution system maintained by the transmis-
sion and distribution utilities.
Deregulation of the Texas electric utility industry went into effect on
January 1, 2002. Although the PUC continues to oversee many aspects of
the transition, market forces, rather than government regulation, now
dictate the prices for the production and sale of electricity to both whole-
sale and retail customers. In a fully deregulated market, REPs will
charge Texas electric customers market-based rates rather than rates set
by the PUC.
B. CHALLENGES TO PUC RULES AND ORDERS
1. Price to Beat
Texas has maintained some control over electricity rates during the
transition to a deregulated pricing system by requiring affiliated REPs to
charge a special discounted rate to certain classes of customers.3 This
rate is known as the "price to beat" and is set by the PUC at "six percent
less than the affiliated electric utility's corresponding average residential
and small commercial rates ... in effect on January 1, 1999."'4 Affiliated
1. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 31.001(a) (Vernon 1998).
2. TEX. UTIL. CODE Arm. § 39.051 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
3. As of January 1, 2000, each privately-owned monopoly utility was required to
divest itself of its retail electricity sales activities and assign those functions to an REP. Id.
Where the transmission, generation, and retail activities of a former monopoly utility con-
tinue to be held by a common holding company, the resulting REP is known as an "affili-
ated REP." REPs that are not a part of a former utility held in a common holding
company are known as "competitive REPs."
4. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.202(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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REPs are required to "make available" the price to beat to qualifying
customers from January 1, 2002, the first day of competition, until Janu-
ary 1, 2007.5 They may not charge rates that are lower than the price to
beat until the earlier of either January 1, 2005, or the date on which "the
commission determines that 40 percent or more of the electric power con-
sumed by [qualifying customers] is committed to be served by nonaf-
filiated retail electric providers."'6
In State v. Public Utility Commission,7 the State of Texas, on behalf of
Texas state colleges, challenged a PUC order that state colleges are not
entitled to benefit from both the price-to-beat rate reduction and the
twenty percent rate discount traditionally given to state colleges. In 1995,
when retail electric service was still fully regulated, the Texas Legislature
enacted Section 36.351 of the PURA. This section requires all utilities to
provide to state-funded four-year universities, upper-level institutions,
technical colleges, and colleges "a [twenty]-percent reduction of the util-
ity's base rates that would otherwise be paid under the applicable tariffed
rate."' 8 Upon enactment of Senate Bill 7, the legislature altered the struc-
ture of the electric-power industry and the nature of the rates that would
be applicable to state colleges in those areas of Texas open to competi-
tion. Senate Bill 7 contains uncodified Section 63 which requires affili-
ated REPs to continue to offer electric service to state colleges for a
period of almost six years, as provided in Section 36.351. 9 They must
provide these services at a rate that is no higher than the applicable rate
on December 31, 2001, the final day of regulation.10
The PUC and affiliated REPs claim that the legislature intended to
preserve a subsidized discount of twenty percent for state colleges rather
than subjecting them to the competitive market with its less favorable
price-to-beat reduction of six percent.11 The State, on the other hand,
believed it was the legislature's intent that state colleges receive both the
traditional twenty percent discount and the six percent price-to-beat rate
reduction. The State argued that state colleges are not expressly ex-
cluded from the price-to-beat provision, contending specifically that "no
one disputes that the residential and small commercial accounts of [the
state colleges] were already receiving, on January 1, 1999, a rate dis-
counted by twenty percent," and therefore that "the rate effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1999 must be discounted by an additional six percent to arrive at
the price-to-beat rate for state colleges which happen to qualify as resi-
dential or small commercial accounts."' 12 Looking at the plain language
of the statutes, the court agreed with the PUC's position that the State's
5. Id.
6. Id. § 39.202(e)(1).
7. State v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 110 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.).
8. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 36.351(b) (Vernon 1998).
9. Act of May 27, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 405, § 63, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2543, 2625.
10. Id.
11. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 110 S.W.3d at 587.
12. Id. at 585.
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
interpretation disregards the phrase "[n]otwithstanding any other provi-
sion" in Sections 36.351 and 63, as well as other material language in the
provisions. The court found that the PUC's interpretation is more rea-
sonable and "that the 'notwithstanding' language indicates that the
twenty percent discount is to operate exclusive of the price-to-beat
reduction.' 13
By making continued application of the twenty percent discount
mandatory, the legislature ensured that state colleges would continue to
receive the discounted and subsidized rates and would be insulated from
the onset of competition. The court held that the PUC reasonably con-
cluded that the legislature sought to benefit Texas state colleges by pre-
serving the more favorable twenty percent discount from the prior
regulatory scheme instead of granting them the six percent discount guar-
anteed in the competitive market by the price-to-beat mechanism. 14
The State also argued that the PUC failed to comply with its own Rule
25.41(f)(1)(C), which provides that affiliated REPs file both price-to-beat
tariffs and documentation supporting the methodology used to determine
the price-to-beat rate.' 5 The State contended that "[a]bsent any evidence
justifying the exclusion of State colleges from the price-to-beat rate re-
ductions, both the statute and the rule require that the January 1, 1999
base rates be reduced by [six percent].' 6 The court disagreed, stating
that although Rule 25.41(f)(1)(C) "allows affiliated [REPs] to request de-
velopment of rates using different methods and different criteria than the
price-to-beat requirements set out in Section 39.202," the rule applies
only "to rates that would otherwise be subject to price-to-beat restructur-
ing, [such as] the rates of residential and small commercial customers that
are not statutorily exempt from the price-to-beat rate requirements.' 17
The rule does not require providers to justify not developing a price-to-
beat for customers who are otherwise exempt.18
Finally, the State argued that the PUC "impermissibly delegated to its
staff the decision on the certified question" and stated that the commis-
sioners simply adopted the recommendation prepared by the PUC's Pol-
icy Development Division. 19 The court held that staff recommendations
may be accepted wholly or in part by the PUC and that, in reviewing the
Commission's order, courts "do not invade the thought processes of the
commissioners or speculate about their individual motivations. '20
13. Id. at 587 (quoting Section 36.351 and what will be Section 63).
14. Id.
15. Id. (referencing 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.41(f)(1)(C)).
16. Id.
17. Id.





2. Stranded Costs Recovery
Stranded costs are costs incurred by a utility as a result of investments
made under the prior regulatory regime that would not be recoverable in
the new competitive market. Before deregulation, a utility could recover
over time its reasonably incurred costs of acquiring power-generation as-
sets through rates approved by the PUC and paid by customers. The
PUC facilitated this cost recovery by incorporating depreciation expenses
into approved rates. In a deregulated market, it was believed that com-
petition might result in rates so low that a formerly-regulated utility
would be unable to recover its investments. Stranded costs represent that
portion of net book value of an electric utility's generation assets that has
not yet been recovered through depreciation and has become unrecover-
able in the competitive market. PURA expressly defines stranded costs
as "the positive excess of the net book value of generation assets over the
market value of those assets."'21
Chapter 39 of the PURA outlines a three-stage program for the recov-
ery of stranded costs. The first stage provided that the PUC must freeze
retail electric rates from September 1999 to December 2001.22 During
this first stage, utilities with identified stranded costs 23 were required to
mitigate them through various measures intended to reduce the book
value of generation assets, such as shifting depreciation from transmission
and distribution assets to generation assets and retaining earnings in ex-
cess of the allowed rate of return.24 The utilities were also permitted to
"securitize" a portion of their estimated stranded costs by selling transi-
tion bonds and using the proceeds to reduce the book value of generation
assets.25 The costs of issuing and servicing transition bonds are borne by
all retail customers in a utility's service area through a nonbypassable
"transition charge." 26
The second stage of stranded cost recovery was implemented as of Jan-
uary 1, 2002, the first day of competition. 27 In this stage, the PUC was
authorized to set a nonbypassable "competition transition charge" to al-
low utilities to recover any stranded costs remaining after the mitigation
procedures and securitization utilized in the first stage. These competi-
tion transition charges were to be included in the tariffs of a utility's affili-
ated unbundled transmission and distribution utility.28 The PUC was
directed to revise its previous stranded cost estimates using "updated
company-specific inputs" when determining whether to set a competition
21. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.251(7) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
22. Id. § 39.052(a).
23. In identifying utilities with stranded costs, the PUC used an "Excess Cost Over
Market" computer model ("ECOM model"). These identified utilities were reported in
the April 1998 Commission Report to the Texas Senate Interim Committee on Electric
Utility Restructuring.
24. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 39.254, .256 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
25. Id. §§ 39.301-.313.
26. Id. §§ 39.302(7), .303(b), (c).
27. Id. § 39.201.




In 2001, estimated stranded cost figures were updated in order to pre-
pare for the rate hearings for transmission and distribution utilities. Un-
expectedly, the updated stranded cost estimates indicated that the
utilities would have no stranded costs. 30 This development resulted from
a substantial increase in natural gas prices in 2000 that had driven the
market value of generation assets well above their book value. Some util-
ities had in fact been overcompensated through their stage one mitigation
procedures and securitization. As a result, the PUC ordered the utilities
to discontinue all mitigation efforts, to reassign the depreciation trans-
ferred from transmission and distribution assets back to those assets, and
to return monthly "excess mitigation credits" to retail providers and to
their ratepayers. However, the PUC did not require the utilities to re-
fund the proceeds received from selling transition bonds and could not,
by statute, modify the transition charge that was imposed on ratepayers
to service bonds.31
The third stage of stranded cost recovery requires the PUC to conduct
a "true-up proceeding" sometime after January 10, 2004.32 The goal of
the true-up proceeding is to determine a utility's actual stranded costs
and to reconcile, or "true-up" this determination with the utility's previ-
ous estimates. The final determination of stranded costs is based on a
new calculation of the value of a utility's generation assets made under
actual competitive conditions. The PUC subtracts the market value of a
utility's generation assets from the book value of those assets.33 If the
difference is a positive number, then the utility has stranded costs for
which it is entitled to recover. If the difference is negative, then the util-
ity has no stranded costs and the PURA does not provide for the return
to ratepayers of any "negative stranded costs." If the true-up proceeding
demonstrates that the utilities over-recovered estimated stranded costs
through their earlier mitigation procedures, the PUC is authorized to
make appropriate adjustments by reducing the unbundled transmission
and distribution utility's rates. 34 The PUC is not authorized to reduce the
transition charge imposed on ratepayers to service transition bonds.35
The PURA also requires that the PUC make several other calculations
29. Id. § 39.201(h).
30. See Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Application of Reliant Energy for Approval of Unbun-
dled Cost of Service Rate Pursuant to PURA § 39.201 and Public Utility Commission Sub-
stantive Rule § 25.344, Docket No. 22355, p. 139; Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Application of
Central Power and Light Company for Approval of Unbundled Cost of Service Rate Pursu-
ant to PURA § 39.201 and Public Utility Commission Substantive Rule § 25.344, Docket
No. 22352, p. 120.
31. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.303(d) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (Transition charges are
"irrevocable and not subject to reduction, impairment, or adjustment by further action of
the commission.").
32. Id. §§ 39.201(1), .262(c).
33. Id. § 39.251(7).
34. Id. § 39.201(l)(3).
35. Id. § 39.303(d).
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in the 2004 true-up proceeding that could affect customer rates.36 These
calculations reconcile previous stranded cost estimates with known values
in various areas and result in either credits or bills to the transmission and
distribution utility from its affiliated power generation company or retail
electric provider. The transmission and distribution utility is to make ad-
justments to its nonbypassable delivery rates charged to REPs.37
a. Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission
Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission 3 8 held that the PUC
exceeded its statutory authority by promulgating a portion of the substan-
tive rule governing the stranded-cost recovery proceeding which allowed
the PUC to net a utility's final negative stranded-cost calculation against
a positive balance from other true-up items such as a utility's final fuel
balance. In the 2004 "true-up" proceeding, the PUC must reconcile the
"actual cost of fuel incurred by the utility with the prior estimate used to
set the 'fuel factor' component of regulated rates during the final period
of traditional regulation. '39 "A positive fuel balance represents money
owed to the utility for under-recovered fuel costs." '40 Electric utilities
challenged a portion of Rule 25.263 that would reduce the positive fuel
balance owed to the utility by any negative stranded-costs, regardless of
whether the negative calculation was caused by market forces or by previ-
ous over-recovery through securitization.4 1
The utilities contended that there is no such thing as negative stranded-
costs and that "the true-up proceeding was never intended to reconcile a
negative stranded-cost calculation against a positive fuel balance calcula-
tion to reduce the amount due to the utility for under-recovered fuel
costs." '42 The PUC, on the other hand, argued "that it has a mandate to
prevent a utility from receiving an over-recovery of stranded costs and
that offsetting sums due for a positive fuel balance is a permissible means
of reversing an over-recovery of stranded costs achieved through
securitization." 43
Rule 25.263 requires the PUC to conduct the following steps in the
true-up proceeding:
1. Stranded costs are calculated by subtracting the "market value of
the utility's generation assets from the net book value of those
assets."144
2. The final fuel balance is calculated by subtracting the "estimated
cost of fuel that was used to set the utility's rates for the final period
36. Id. § 39.262(d)-(g).
37. Id. § 39.262(g).
38. Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 101 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. App.-Austin
2003, pet. granted).
39. Id. at 136.
40. Id.
41. Id. (referencing 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.263(1)).
42. Id. at 136-37.




of regulation and the actual cost of fuel for that period. '45 The
stranded costs determined in the first step are then netted against the
fuel balance. 46
3. A "capacity-auction true-up" amount is calculated by subtracting
the price the utility was estimated to be able to obtain for its power
on the wholesale market in the second stage from the price the utility
actually received during the first two years of competition. The ca-
pacity-auction true-up amount is netted against the amount reached
in the second step.47
4. The PUC conducts "a prudence review of regulatory assets not
previously approved in a prior [PUC] rate order but [that are] being
recovered through securitization in the form of a transition charge or
through a competition transition charge imposed during the second
stage of stranded-cost recovery. '48 "If the [PUC] determines that
these assets were not prudently incurred, it will subtract them from
the true-up balance as determined in steps one through three. '49
If the resulting balance from these four steps is positive, the utility is "en-
titled to recover that amount through a competition transition charge as-
sessed to its transmission and distribution customers. °5 0 If the balance is
negative, the PUC will "(1) reverse any existing competition transition
charge, then (2) reverse any remaining mitigation proceeds, then (3) im-
pose on utilities that have sold transition bonds a negative competition
transition charge based on the lesser of the absolute value of the remain-
ing negative true-up balance or the amount the utility has securitized. ' '5 1
The electric utilities challenged the PUC's authority to net the final
stranded-cost calculation with other true-up items, such as a utility's final
fuel balance. The PUC maintained, however, that "(1) these other true-
up items are themselves potential stranded costs and, (2) even if they are
not, netting is a permissible means of preventing over-recovery of
stranded costs by those utilities that received a windfall through securi-
tization. ' '5 2 The PUC took the position that "because coal, gas, nuclear,
and other types of fuel are 'indisputably assets associated with the pro-
duction of electricity,' they constitute generation assets that could be-
come stranded. '53
The court rejected the PUC's attempt to characterize the final fuel bal-
ance and the other true-up items as stranded costs. The court observed




48. Id. at 137-38.
49. Id. at 138.
50. Id. (referencing 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.263(1)(2)(A)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 138-39.
53. Id. at 139. "Generation assets mean all assets associated with the production of
electricity, including generation plants, electrical interconnections of the generation plant
to the transmission system, fuel contracts, fuel transportation contracts, water contracts,
lands, surface or subsurface water rights, emissions-related allowances, and gas pipeline
interconnections." Id. (quoting TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.251(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
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covered under separate sections of Chapter 39 of the PURA and are
treated as distinct concepts rather than the fuel balance being treated as a
component of stranded costs. The PURA treats the other true-up items
in a similar manner. The court held that the rule netting a negative
stranded-cost calculation against a positive balance produced from the
other true-up items is not authorized by PURA. Under the statute, utili-
ties are not required to refund negative stranded costs to ratepayers, and
the PUC may not require such a refund by calling the other true-up items
"stranded costs."'54
The court also addressed the PUC's argument that netting the calcula-
tions is a permissible means of preventing over-recovery of stranded costs
by those utilities that received a windfall through securitization. PURA
mandates that the PUC ensure that no utility over-recover its stranded
costs. 55 Relying on its implied powers to reasonably fulfill its express du-
ties,56 the PUC insisted that "netting the various true-up items is a per-
missible way to prevent over-recovery [of stranded costs,] effectively
forcing the utilities that sold transition bonds based on earlier invalid
stranded-cost estimates to disgorge amounts to which they are not
entitled."57
The court, however, found the PUC's rule to be overbroad, explaining
that the rule did not "limit the amount by which a negative stranded-cost
calculation can offset other positive true-up balances to a utility's previ-
ous over-recovery. '58 The court's decision stated that the PUC had the
discretion under its implied powers "to net a negative stranded-cost cal-
culation against the other true-up items only to the extent that the utility
over-recovered stranded costs through securitization. '59 The PUC "has
no statutory authority to net negative stranded costs attributable to mar-
ket forces."'60
The utilities additionally claimed that the PUC exceeded its statutory
authority in promulgating a rule that implemented "the partial stock val-
uation method."' 61 PURA authorizes the PUC to use the partial stock
valuation method to establish the value of generation assets when a utility
has transferred some or all of those assets to affiliated or nonaffiliated
corporations and ninteen to fifty-one percent of the common stock of
each such corporation is spun off and sold to public investors through a
54. Id. at 140-41.
55. Id.
56. When the legislature expressly confers a power on a state agency, it also impliedly
intends that the agency have whatever powers are reasonably necessary to fulfill its express
functions or duties. Id. at 141-42 (citing Pub. Util. Comm'n v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 53
S.W.3d 310, 316 (Tex. 2001)).
57. Id. at 142.
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 143.
61. Id.; see TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.262(h)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004); 16 TEX. AD-
MIN. CODE § 25.263(f)(1)(C).
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national stock exchange and traded for at least a year.62 The PUC calcu-
lates "the value of the [generation] assets held by the transferee corpora-
tion, presumably an unbundled power generation company, by adding the
market value of its common stock to the book value of its preferred stock
and its debt."63
The utilities specifically challenged the method employed in the rule to
calculate the control premium.64 Market value of common stock is gener-
ally presumed to be the average daily closing price over a period of thirty
consecutive trading days, selected by the PUC, with some constraints. 65
The PURA also authorizes the PUC to convene a panel of three financial
experts to determine whether a control premium exists for the retained
common stock, specifying that "[i]f the panel determines that a control
premium exists for the retained interest, the panel shall determine the
amount of the control premium, and the [Clommission shall adopt the
determination . . . [but may not increase] the market value by a control
premium greater than [ten] percent."'66 However, the PUC's Rule
25.263(f)(1)(C)(v) provides that the PUC must adopt the panel's determi-
nation of the amount of the control premium, but it "may not use the
control premium to increase the value of the assets by more than [ten
percent]. " 67
The utilities argued that the PURA gives the PUC authority only "to
apply the control premium to increase the value of the retained common
stock equity by up to ten percent" and claimed "that the rule [was] inva-
lid because it instead allows the [PUC] to apply the control premium to
increase by up to ten percent the value of all the corporation's assets."'68
The PUC maintained that, although PURA prohibits it employing a con-
trol premium greater than ten percent to increase the market value, the
statute does not specify to which asset the 10% control premium may be
applied. The court disagreed with the PUC, explaining that the rule es-
sentially impermissibly adds the additional language "of all the corpora-
tion's assets" to the statutory phrase "by a control premium no greater
than [ten] percent. '6 9 The court stated that the meaning of the statute is
"unmistakable without such an addition. '70 A "'control premium of ten
percent' would naturally increase the value of the retained block of
shares by ten percent, [while] 'a control premium no greater than [ten]
percent' is limited to increasing the value of the retained block of shares
62. Reliant Energy, 101 S.W.3d at 143.
63. Id. at 143-44.
64. Id. at 144. A control premium is the additional value that a block of shares obtains
by virtue of the fact that it carries with it the power to control the corporation and is
commonly calculated by comparing the aggregate value of the controlling block of shares
with the cost that would be incurred if the shares could be acquired at the going market
price per share. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (7th ed. 1999)).
65. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.262(h)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
66. Reliant Energy, 101 S.W.3d at 144 (emphasis in original).
67. Id. (citing 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.263(f)(1)(C)(v)).
68. Id. at 144.
69. Id. at 144-45.
70. Id. at 145.
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by no more than ten percent. '71 The court held that the PUC exceeded
its statutory authority by promulgating the portion of the rule that would
apply the control-premium cap to all of the corporation's assets.72
The court also found that the rule impermissibly allows the PUC to
consider not only the valuation panel's determination of the control pre-
mium, but also "other admitted evidence. '73 The PURA provides that
"the determination of the commission based on the finding of the panel
conclusively establishes the value of the common stock in each transferee
corporation. '74 The PUC's rule, however, provides "that the [PUC] is to
determine the value of the common stock of the transferee corporation
'based on the findings of the Commission and other admitted evi-
dence."75 The court held that the legislative intent behind PURA was
that the panel's determination of the control premium is conclusive and
that the language of the rule improperly allows the PUC to consider
whatever evidence it chooses to increase the value of the common
stock.76
Recovery of stranded costs by utilities that do not securitize their
stranded costs may take a number of years. PUC Rule 25.263 allows a
utility with stranded costs to recover interest on the true-up balance. 77
Although the rule provides that interest is calculated from the date of the
final true-up order until stranded costs are fully recovered, the utilities
contended that interest should be calculated from the time the costs be-
came "stranded," i.e., the first day of competition, January 1, 2002. In
contrast, the PUC believed, and the court agreed, that stranded costs
come into existence only after the true-up proceeding. While "the book
value to be used by the [PUG] at the true-up proceeding is determined as
of December 31, 2001, its calculations are to be based on the market
value as determined in the proceeding. '78 The court held that the inter-
est provision of the rule adequately provided the utilities with full recov-
ery of their stranded costs. 79
Finally, the utilities challenged substantive Rule 25.263(e)(4), which al-
lows the PUC to reduce the net book value of an affiliated power genera-
tion company's generation assets if the PUC determines that the a
utility's successor affiliates have failed to pursue commercially reasonable




74. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.262(h)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
75. Reliant Energy, 101 S.W.3d at 145 (emphasis in original).
76. Id.
77. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.263(l)(3). "[As a result] of the time value of money,
this interest represents a portion of the 'net, verifiable, nonmitigable stranded costs' that a
utility has a right to recover under chapter thirty-nine." Reliant Energy, 101 S.W.3d at 146.
78. Reliant Energy, 101 S.W.3d at 146.
79. Id. at 147.
80. Id. at 148; see TEX. UTIL CODE ANN. § 39.252(a) (providing that a utility is only
allowed to recover stranded costs that are "nonmitigable") and § 39.252(d) (requiring "an
electric utility ... [to] pursue commercially reasonable means to reduce its potential
2004]
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utility's duty to reduce its potential stranded costs ended once it unbun-
died into successor affiliates [and that the PUC] lacks the authority to
reduce the book value of generation assets."'8 1 The court rejected both
arguments and upheld this portion of the rule.
82
In summary, the court in Reliant held that the PUC impermissibly
promulgated the portion of Rule 25.263 that (1) unqualifiedly allowed a
negative stranded-cost calculation to offset other amounts a utility may
become entitled to at the true-up proceeding and (2) in the application of
the partial stock valuation method, allowed the PUC to apply the ten
percent control-premium cap to the value of all corporate assets and to
second-guess the valuation of the panel by considering other admitted
evidence.83 The court upheld the remaining portions of the rule chal-
lenged by the utilities. 84
b. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission
In many cases, stranded costs are attributable to investments in nuclear
power plants. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission85
held that a Texas Supreme Court statement to the effect that there was
extensive evidence supporting inclusion in an electric utility's rate base of
all costs an electric utility incurred in constructing a nuclear power plant
was not "law of the case" as to the issue of whether the utility had estab-
lished a prima facie case that costs were prudently incurred. Entergy
Gulf States, Inc. ("EGSI") appealed a PUC final order denying EGSI a
rate increase to recover additional amounts from its share in the construc-
tion of the River Bend Nuclear Generating Station ("River Bend"), a
nuclear power plant located in St. Francisville, Louisiana. The PUC's de-
nial of EGSI's request was based on EGSI's failure "to present a prima
facie case that the additional cost of the plant's construction above the
adjusted definitive cost estimate ("DCE") 86 was prudent. '87
stranded costs, including good faith attempts to renegotiate above-cost fuel and purchased
power contracts or the exercise of normal business practices to protect the value of its
assets"); 16 TEx. ADMIN.. CODE § 25.263(e)(4) (If the PUC determines that a utility's suc-
cessor affiliates "have failed, individually or in combination, to fully comply with their
obligations under PURA § 39.252(d), the commission may reduce the net book value of
the [affiliated power generation company's ] generation assets or take other measures it
deems appropriate in the true-up proceeding filed under this section.").
81. Reliant Energy, 101 S.W.3d at 148.
82. Id. at 148-49.
83. Id. at 149.
84. Id. at 149-50.
85. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 112 S.W.3d 208, 212-14 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2003, pet. filed) (discussing Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 947
S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1997)).
86. DCE is the 1979 estimate of River Bend's total cost of construction.
87. Entergy Gulf States, 112 S.W.3d at 210. The PUC defines the standard of prudence
as "[t]he exercise of that judgment and the choosing of one of that select range of options
which a reasonable utility manager would exercise or choose in the same or similar circum-
stances given the information or alternatives available at the point in time such judgment is
exercised or option is chosen." Id. at 210 n.2.
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Construction of River Bend was begun in 1977 and completed in 1986.
River Bend then began serving customers in southeast Texas and south
central Louisiana. Construction costs were approximately $4.5 billion,
which exceeded the original cost estimate. EGSI was responsible for sev-
enty percent of River Bend's construction costs. In 1986, EGSI (1)
sought a rate increase, which would include approximately $3.15 billion
of its River Bend construction costs in its cost of service, and (2) initiated
a contested case to determine what portion of its total costs it might in-
clude in its rate base as being a "prudent" investment. These two pro-
ceedings were consolidated by the PUC in Docket 7195.88
The hearing examiners in Docket 7195 included the following conclu-
sions in their report: "(1) $274 million, or nine percent (later adjusted to
8.3 percent) of the total plant cost should be excluded from [EGSI's] cost
of service as imprudently incurred; (2) [EGSI's] decision to restart con-
struction of River Bend in 1979, [after a suspension of construction from
October 1977 to February 1979] was prudent; and (3) a reasonable DCE,
based on information available in 1979, should have been $2.273 billion
('adjusted DCE'), instead of [EGSI's] 1979 estimate of $1.729 billion
('original DCE')."89 The PUC adopted only part of the examiners' rec-
ommendations: (1) the decision to build River Bend was prudent and (2)
the original DCE should be adjusted upward to $2.273 billion. Thus,
EGSI's "seventy percent share of the prudently incurred cost was $1.591
billion." 90 Instead of adopting the hearing examiners' recommendation
that the PUC disallow only 8.3% of the total plant cost, the PUC deferred
its decision on whether EGSI prudently incurred the remaining $1.453
billion in additional costs because it found the evidence inadequate to
support a determination of either prudence or imprudence regarding the
construction costs in excess of $2.273 billion.91
EGSI sought judicial review of the PUC's final order in Docket 7195
and concurrently filed a new contested case ("Docket 8702") to address
the $1.453 billion not adjudicated in Docket 7195. In response, the Office
of Public Utility Counsel ("OPUC") and twelve municipalities sued the
PUC for a declaratory judgment that the PUC was not authorized to re-
consider in a separate contested case the prudence of the $1.453 billion
expenditure deferred in Docket 7195. The OPUC and the twelve munici-
palities requested a permanent injunction restraining the PUC from con-
ducting any further proceedings addressing the prudence of the deferral
in Docket 7195. The district court held that res judicata and collateral
estoppel barred the PUC from reconsidering the deferred costs and en-
joined the PUC from proceeding with Docket 8702. On appeal, the court
of appeals reversed this decision and allowed Docket 8702 to proceed. 92
88. Id. at 210-11.
89. Id. at 211 (emphasis in original).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Pub. Util Comm'n v. Coalition of Cities for Affordable Util. Rates, 777 S.W.2d
814 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd, 798 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1990).
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The Texas Supreme Court reversed that decision, stating "the PUC was
powerless to defer its decision to a future proceeding, '93 and the appeal
in Docket 7195 proceeded in district court where the PUC's final order
was reversed and the rate case was remanded to the PUC.
On remand, the PUC determined that the remaining portions of the
order in Docket 7195 "appeared to hold that [Entergy] had failed to meet
its burden" and the $1.453 billion was properly excluded.94 Entergy ap-
pealed this order, and the district court reversed the PUC order. On ap-
peal, the district court ruling was reversed, and the PUC order
disallowing the $1.453 billion was approved.95 The Texas Supreme Court
again reversed and stated that the PUC could decide whether to entertain
further evidence or resolve the case on the evidence previously
presented. 96
The PUC opened Docket 17899 and decided to base its decision on the
then-existing record and asked the parties to brief the case again. EGSI
agreed to this approach. In its final order in Docket 17899, the PUC ex-
cluded the $1.453 billion from EGSI's cost of service. EGSI then sought
judicial review of the order in district court, which affirmed the order. 97
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission is the appeal of the
district court's ruling brought by EGSI.
Entergy first argued that the PUC disregarded the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion in Gulf States Utilities and the law of the case doctrine,
which "provides that questions of law decided on appeal to a court of last
resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages. '98 EGSI
maintained that "[a]s a matter of law ... the Supreme Court decided that
[Entergy] had presented a significant amount of evidence supporting the
prudence of its entire investment, and that a total disallowance was not
supported by the record." 99 Specifically, EGSI relied on the following
language in the Texas Supreme Court's opinion: "There was extensive
evidence supporting inclusion of all [Entergy's] costs in its rate base and
extensive contrary evidence that most of these costs should be ex-
cluded." 100 EGSI's interpretation of this language was that the supreme
court recognized that EGSI "presented sufficient evidence to establish its
prima facie case." 10 1 The district court disagreed, interpreting the su-
preme court's statement as a comment on the quantity and not the qual-
ity of the evidence introduced. The court discussed the fact that nowhere
in the supreme court's opinion did it discuss whether EGSI has estab-
93. Coalition of Cities, 798 S.W.2d at 564-65.
94. Id.
95. See Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Coalition of Cities for Affordable Util. Rates, 883
S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994), rev'd, 947 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1997).
96. Gulf States Utils., 947 S.W.2d at 892.
97. Id.
98. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 112 S.W.3d 208, 213 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2003, pet. filed (citing Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.1986)).
99. Id.




lished a prima facie case or met its burden of substantial evidence. The
court found that the law of the case doctrine was inapplicable because the
supreme court did not comment on the weight of EGSI's evidence.
EGSI's first issue on appeal was overruled.
10 2
EGSI next contended that the PUC erred in ruling that EGSI "had not
established its prima facie case of prudence for inclusion of the $1.453
billion in the rate base."'01 3 Utilities bear the burden of proving that rate
changes are just and reasonable. 10 4 Under PUC procedure, the utility
may shift this burden by establishing a prima facie case of prudence in its
rate change. The PUC's conclusion that EGSI did not establish a prima
facie case of prudence was based on its repeated review of the entire
record. The court held that based on this review, the PUC correctly ruled
that EGSI failed in its statutory burden of proof. Further, the court
found that the findings of fact and conclusions of law included in the
PUC's order were a clear indication that EGSI received a "straightfor-
ward decision" on the PUC's determination that the $1.453 billion would
not be included in EGSI's rate base.10 5
EGSI's third issue on appeal was that the PUC's order was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Specifically, EGSI argued that the fol-
lowing actions were not supported by substantial evidence:
(1) the PUC failed to find any prudent costs associated with the
schedule extension; (2) the [PUC failed] to allow recovery of the full
financing costs associated with the River Bend investment that it
found prudent; (3) the disallowance is contrary to undisputed expert
testimony and has no reasonable basis in the record as a whole; and
(4) the record as a whole demonstrates concurrence of the expert
witnesses in the prudence of certain costs in excess of the adjusted
DCE.10 6
The court's standard of review for a substantial evidence claim is whether
"the evidence as a whole is such that reasonable minds could have
reached the conclusion the agency must have reached in order to take the
disputed action."'01 7 Upon a review of the evidence, the court held that
there was substantial evidence to support the PUC's decision on these
issues.
EGSI also argued that it elected not to oppose the PUC's decision not
to accept a cost-reconciliation study as evidence in Docket 17899, based
on an earlier PUC ruling "that a cost-reconciliation study was not a nec-
102. The law of the case doctrine "does not necessarily apply if the issues and facts are
not substantially the same in a subsequent trial," and the use of the doctrine should be "left
to the discretion of the court and determined on a case-by-case basis." Id.
103. Id. at 214.
104. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 36.006 (Vernon 1998).
105. Entergy Gulf States, 112 S.W.2d at 218.
106. Id.




essary element of a prima facie case." 10 8 EGSI claimed that it could have
submitted its cost-reconciliation study in response to the PUC's assertion
in its order in Docket 17899 that EGSI failed to "present any credible
reconciliation of plant costs with specific causes."109 The court, however,
found that EGSI supported the PUC's decision not to take additional
evidence and had been afforded opportunities to submit additional evi-
dence and had declined to do so. The court found that EGSI's argument
that a later PUC decision rendered the cost-reconciliation study unneces-
sary obscured the fact that EGSI had ample opportunity to fully develop
the record. 110
Finally, the court overruled EGSI's claim that the PUC erroneously
adjusted rates to include EGSI's payments to repurchase River Bend
from its project partner and that the PUC denied recovery of EGSI's
payments to its project partner in proportion to the amount of River
Bend investment to which it denied recovery. The court based its deci-
sion on its earlier approval of the PUC's determination that any costs
above the adjusted DCE were imprudent, which made recalculation of
"flow through" costs unnecessary.111
3. Transmission and Distribution Rates
City of Abilene v. Public Utility Commission'1 2 was an appeal by the
cities of Abilene, San Angelo, and Vernon (the "Cities") of a PUC order
approving West Texas Utilities Company's ("WTU") application for ap-
proval of unbundled cost of service rates.1 13 The Cities opposed a provi-
sion of the order that imposed "an eighty percent demand ratchet for
transmission and distribution rates on municipal water pumping
customers."
114
As part of deregulation, the PUC continued to regulate transmission
and distribution rates, and utilities submitted applications for approval of
unbundled costs of service. The PUC held a generic proceeding to iden-
tify the transmission and distribution rate issues common to all applicants
"and issued an interim order establishing customer classifications and
rate designs." 115 As a part of the interim order, the PUC imposed "an
eighty percent demand ratchet on transmission and distribution rates for
customers with electric meters that tracked demand."116 Under the
eighty percent demand ratchet, the utility bases the customer's transmis-
108. Id. at 220; see Tex. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Application of Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. for
Authority to Change Rates, Docket No. 9300, 17 TEX. P.U.C. BULL. 2057 (September 27,
1991).
109. Entergy Gulf States, 112 S.W.3d at 220.
110. Id. at 221.
111. Id.
112. City of Abilene v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, No. 03-02-00569-CV, 2003 WL 549297 (Tex.
App.-Austin Feb. 27, 2003, pet. denied).
113. Id. at *1.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at *1 n.3.
[Vol. 57
Energy Regulation
sion and distribution billing rate on the greater of current monthly de-
mand or eighty percent of the customer's monthly demand for the
preceding eleven months. 117 The interim order also exempted seasonal
agricultural customers, such as cotton ginners, from the demand ratchet.
The basis for the exemption was that cotton ginners operate for only sixty
to ninety days annually and use minimal electricity during the rest of the
year. 118
In the generic proceeding, the PUC denied all other applications for
the exemption from the demand ratchet. The interim order stated that
the PUC
would consider exemptions to the generic rate design "only if neces-
sary to address extraordinary impacts on the ability of customers to
obtain service from a competitive provider due to the restrictions on
the price to beat (i.e., 'headroom' concerns)." The order went on to
state that "because the transmission and distribution rates . ..re-
present a relatively small proportion of an end-use customer's bill,
the design of such rates shall be amended only in the case of excep-
tional headroom concerns. Such headroom concerns should not au-
tomatically mandate the granting of an exception to the generic rate
design. '"119
"'Headroom' refers to the margin between the price to beat and the new
retailer's costs of providing electricity. '120
The Cities sought an exemption from the demand ratchet in WTU's
individual ratemaking proceeding. The Cities reasoned that municipal
water pumping customers were entitled to the exemption because their
variable electrical demand was similar to that of the cotton ginners. Im-
posing a demand ratchet on this variable demand would cause lower
"headroom" and create a disadvantage for the municipal water pumping
customers in seeking competitive electric rates. However, the PUC ruled
that municipal water pumping customers were not included in the exemp-
tion because the expansion of the exemption "is not warranted on the
basis of extraordinary headroom concerns."1 21
The Cities sought review of the WTU order in district court, which up-
held the order. The Cities appealed the district court judgment, arguing
that the PUC's unequal rate treatment of cotton ginners and municipal
water pumping customers was unreasonable discrimination in ratemaking
and a violation of the PURA Section 36.003(c). 122 They further con-
117. Id.
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. (alteration in original).
120. Id. at *1 n.5.
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id. (citing TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 36.003(c) (Vernon 1998)). "An electric utility
may not (1) grant an unreasonable preference or advantage concerning rates to a person in
a classification; (2) subject a person in a classification to an unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage concerning rates; or (3) establish or maintain an unreasonable difference con-




tended that the PUC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by applying one
standard to cotton ginners and a "'different, vague standard' to municipal
water pumping customers. '123
The PURA gives the PUC the authority to set transmission and distri-
bution rates. Section 36.003(c) provides that a utility may not grant an
"unreasonable preference or advantage concerning rates" or "subject a
person in a classification to an unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage
concerning rates. ' 12 4 In some circumstances, differentiation in treatment
between customers is warranted, and such "unequal treatment neither vi-
olates PURA nor invalidates an agency action."'1 25 The PUC "must base
its disparate treatment on substantial and reasonable differences between
the customers."'1 26 "Factors for distinctions between customers include
quantity of service received, different characteristics of service, time of
use, 'or any other matter which presents a substantial difference as a
ground of distinction."1 27
The Cities believed that the municipal water pumping customers were
situated similarly to the cotton ginners and that, based upon WTU's data
on electrical demands and headroom, the municipal water pumping cus-
tomers deserved the same exemption to the demand ratchet. 128 They fur-
ther contended that the PUC's unequal rate treatment was unjustified
because the PUC failed to identify substantial differences between the
municipal water pumping customers and the cotton ginners.
The court disagreed with the Cities' position and found evidence of a
"substantial and reasonable difference" between the municipal water
pumping customers and the cotton ginners which justified the unequal
rate treatment.' 2 9 The cotton ginners use large amounts of electricity for
sixty to ninety days per year, with little or no use during the remainder of
the year. The demand ratchet exemption for the cotton ginners was
based on "highly variable usage patterns within the year" which were
"unique.' 130 The evidence presented by the Cities showed that their de-
mand varied "significantly from month to month" and the Cities would
experience negative headroom as a result of the demand ratchet.' 3 ' The
court held that the PUC's determination that the Cities' demand was not
as variable as the cotton ginners' demand qualified as a "substantial and
reasonable" difference, justifying the disparate rate treatment, and that
the PUC's decision not to include municipal water pumping customers in
the demand ratchet exemption "was not an 'unreasonable preference or
advantage concerning rates' to the cotton ginners. ' '132
123. City of Abilene, 2003 WL 549297, at *2.
124. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 36.003(c).
125. City of Abilene, 2003 WL 549297, at *3.




130. Id. at *5.
131. Id.




In preparation for deregulation, the PURA was amended in 1999 to set
all electric utilities' interim rates until January 1, 2002. The amended pro-
visions also included a requirement that utilities file annual reports with
the PUC for each of the calendar years 1999, 2000, and 2001.133 The utili-
ties were required to submit the annual reports in a format prescribed by
the PUC.'34 The purpose of these reports was to identify any excess or
"positive difference" of "adjusted annual revenues" over and above the
utility's "annual costs."'1 35 The PURA mandates that the excess revenue
be applied to either stranded cost recovery efforts, customer refunds, im-
provements on transmission and distribution facilities, or additional pol-
lution-control equipment.1 36
American Electric Power Co. v. Public Utility Commission137 held that
utilities are not required to subtract from invested capital any portion of
their accumulated deferred income tax ("ADIT") accounts attributable
to under-recovered fuel costs. American Electric Power ("AEP") and
TXU Electric Company ("TXU") challenged a PUC order requiring
them to revise their annual reports to include a deduction from their in-
vested capital in the amount of their ADIT accounts attributable to fuel-
cost under-recovery.1 38
The 1999 amendments to the PURA outline the calculations and ad-
justments to be used in the annual report for the purpose of identifying
any excess of annual revenue over annual costs. 139 Revenues for the cal-
endar year are adjusted by deducting revenues derived from specified
sources, including "sums received by the utility as a result of any [PUC]
adjustment of the reporting utility's fixed-fuel factor and a subsequent
reconciliation as contemplated" by Section 36.203 of the PURA.140 Costs
for the calendar year are adjusted in order to arrive at the utility's annual
costs. "Among these [adjustments] are costs resulting from [PUC] adjust-
ments of the utility's fixed-fuel cost and a subsequent reconciliation."' 14 1
There are several key concepts germane to the controversy in this case.
First among them is the term "invested capital." "[T]he 1999 amend-
ments included a provision for fixing the utility's return on invested capi-
tal" in the annual report. 142 "Invested capital" is not a defined term
133. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.257(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
134. Id.
135. Id. § 39.257(b).
136. See id. §§ 39.254, .255. A utility is benefited by maximizing its annual costs while
minimizing its calendar-year revenues, because in doing so it reduces the amount of any
excess that must be applied to these items while increasing the amount retained by the
utility for operating and other costs of service.
137. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 123 S.W.3d 33 (Tex. App.-Austin
2003, no pet.).
138. Id. at 35.
139. Id. at 35-36.
140. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.257(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
141. Id. § 39.258.
142. Id. § 39.258(7).
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under the PURA, but its components are described broadly thereunder
as "property used by and useful to the utility in providing service," which
is appraised based on original costs less depreciation. 143 The PURA fur-
ther states "[t]he definition and identification of invested capital ... shall
be treated in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as
modified by regulatory accounting rules generally applicable to
utilities. 144
Section 39.259 of the PURA provides that both "regulatory assets and
deferred federal income taxes shall be updated each year" before calcu-
lating the utility's invested capital for purposes of the annual report. 145
"'Regulatory assets' enlarge invested capital while 'deferred federal in-
come taxes' reduce invested capital. ' 146 Thus, a utility's annual costs in-
crease and decrease with a corresponding change in invested capital. 147
An understanding of the role of deferred income taxes in this case is
also essential. "A utility's under-recovery of fuel costs may create other
accounts on its books, including a record of its expected liability for fed-
eral income tax on the revenues it anticipates receiving at some future
date when the PUC authorizes the inclusion of a surcharge in customer
bills." Until the "payment of the surcharges is actually received, the util-
ity's federal income-tax liability is said to be 'deferred.' 1 48 While the
liability remains deferred, it may be included in an ADIT account.149
"In their annual reports for calendar year 2000, [AEP and TXU] ex-
cluded from their invested capital the balance in both their under-recov-
ered fuel-cost account and the corresponding part of their ADIT
account." 150 The PUC ordered the utilities "to revise their annual reports
to include in their invested-capital calculation a deduction equal to the
amount of ADIT attributable to a future fuel-factor adjustment and rec-
onciliation. '151 The district court affirmed the PUC's order.152
The PUC argued that ADIT should be included as a deduction from
invested capital on two grounds: (1) the language in Section 39.259(a) of
PURA that calls for an annual update of deferred federal income taxes
indicates a legislative intent that the total amount of a utility's ADIT ac-
count must be included as an offset to invested capital, including that part
of ADIT attributable to a future fuel-cost adjustment and reconciliation;
and, (2) that part of the ADIT account attributable to fuel-cost under-
recovery "is not a fuel cost or revenue recovered in the fuel-factor/fuel
reconciliation process [but] is, instead, cash realized from the infusion of
143. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 36.053(a) (Vernon 1998).
144. Id. § 39.260(a).
145. Id. § 39.259(a).






152. Id. at 38.
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cost-free capital as a result of the deferral of income tax expense. '153
The court rejected both of these arguments. As to the first, the court
explained that Section 39.259(a) of PURA sets forth no exception from
the required inclusion of "regulatory assets" in the annual update.1 54 The
PUC properly excluded from regulatory assets the balance in the under-
recovered fuel-cost account because the exclusion was necessary to com-
ply with the required adjustment for annual revenues under the fuel cost
recovery provisions of Section 36.203 of the PURA. 155
Regarding the PUC's second argument, the court disagreed with the
PUC's characterization of an under-recovered fuel-cost item in the ADIT
account as "cash realized from the infusion of cost-free capital as a result
of the deferral of income tax expense. ' 156 The portion of a utility's ADIT
account attributable to fuel-cost under-recoveries represents merely a re-
cord of a prospective liability for federal income tax, which will not actu-
ally arise until the utility's customers pay their bills containing a
surcharge authorized by the PUC following a fuel-factor adjustment and
fuel-cost reconciliation. The court determined that the recording of de-
ferred income taxes does not produce cost-free capital because the funds
do not become available until the customers payments are actually col-
lected. The PUC's order requiring utilities "to include in their invested-
capital calculation a deduction... in the amount of their ADIT account
attributable to fuel-cost under-recovery" was invalid and was therefore
reversed.1 57
5. Consumer Protection
Under deregulation, consumers are exposed to dangers that the regu-
lated system was designed to protect against, such as potential market-
price manipulation by incumbent utilities and affiliated REPs, decisions
by REPs not to serve given areas or customer classes, and poor treatment
of consumers on billing and service matters. The PUC has adopted a
system for protecting consumers in circumstances where REPs are unwill-
ing to provide service to a particular area or class of customer. The
PURA requires that a "provider of last resort" ("POLR") be designated
for each distribution area in order to ensure that all consumers will be
offered electricity service. Each customer is entitled to service from the
POLR under a standard service package determined by the PUC.a58 The
POLR is to be an REP chosen by a competitive mechanism or designated
by the PUC.159
153. Id. (alteration in original).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting PUC's brief).
157. Id. at 39.
158. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.101(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
159. Id. § 39.106(a), (e).
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In Office of Public Utility Counsel v. Public Utility Commission,160 the
Office of Public Utility Counsel ("OPUC") challenged two amended
rules as being outside the scope of the PUC's authority under the
PURA.161 The first rule concerned the authority of competitive REPs to
request disconnection of customer electric service, and the second rule
governed the rate to be charged by POLRs.
The original disconnection rule promulgated by the PUC "allowed only
POLRs to request disconnection of customer service when customers
failed to pay" their bills162 because the PUC was concerned that the der-
egulation process would disrupt electricity service. 163 The original dis-
connection rule required REPs that no longer wished to serve certain
customers to transfer those customers directly to the POLR without any
interruption in service, which meant that non-paying customers would au-
tomatically be transferred to the POLR before their service could be dis-
connected. 164 In the amended disconnection rule, the PUC adopted a
provision to the effect that, after 2004, the competitive REPs would be
able to request disconnection of non-paying customers without first trans-
ferring them to the POLR. 165 "The [PUC] determined that, as opposed
to customers who received no electricity service because of market forces,
customers who were delinquent in paying their bills would not be entitled
to be automatically transferred to POLR service. '166 Under the
amended disconnection rule, after September 4, 2002, non-paying cus-
tomers are to be transferred to the affiliated REP and charged the appli-
cable price-to-beat, and then, after October 2004, all REPs will be
allowed to request disconnection of non-paying customers.1 67
OPUC's second challenge was to the PUC's original POLR rule that
governed POLR selection, using a competitive bidding process to set the
POLR rate with the default rate set at the price to beat.1 68 If no REPs
participated in the competitive-bidding process, then the original POLR
rule provided that the PUC would determine the POLR and set the
POLR's rate at the price to beat.1 69 However, the PUC had a difficult
time finding utilities willing to serve as POLRs under the original POLR
rule, so the agency amended the POLR rule to provide that the POLR
160. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 104 S.W.3d 225 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2003, no pet.).
161. Id. at 227.
162. Id. at 230. POLRs and REPs must submit requests to the transmission and distri-
bution utility, which is the entity that actually disconnects the customer's electric service.
Id. at 230 n.2.
163. Id. at 230 (referencing 27 Tex. Reg. 8428 (2002) (to be codified at 16 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 25.483) (the "Original Disconnection Rule") and 27 Tex. Reg. 8428, 8428-8430
(2002) (to be codified at 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.483) (the "Amended Disconnection
Rule")).
164. Id.
165. Id. (referencing 27 Tex. Reg. 8474).
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Disconnection Rule § 25.483(b)).
168. Id. (referencing 25 Tex. Reg. 10899, 10916 (2000) (repealed by 27 Tex. Reg. 8428
(2002)) (to be codified at 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.43)).
169. Id. at 230-31.
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rate would be set at or above the price to beat, with a ceiling of twenty-
five percent greater than the price to beat.' 70 The amended POLR rule
treats affiliated REP that serve as a POLR differently from other REPs
bidding to serve as a POLR. Affiliated REPs may only serve as POLRs if
they bid to provide POLR service at the lowest price, the price to beat. 171
The amended POLR rule provides that a POLR is to be selected either
by a competitive bidding process or, if there are no bidders, by lottery. If
the POLR is selected by lottery, the rate charged to residential and small
commercial customers is set at the highest allowable rate, twenty-five per-
cent greater than the price to beat. 172 The PUC is given the authority to
adjust the POLR rate "for good cause to ensure that it is sufficient to
recover the POLR's cost of providing service. ' 173
OPUC brought a direct appeal to challenge the validity of the amended
disconnection and POLR rules, arguing that PURA "creates an affirma-
tive right in consumers to be offered (1) POLR service 'without interrup-
tion' and (2) electric service at or under the applicable price to beat."'1 74
OPUC contended that the PUC's disconnection and POLR "rules may
only be adopted in order to further and enforce the consumer-protec-
tions" created in Chapter 39 of the PURA, and any rule that is contrary
to consumers' specific rights to POLR disconnection and the price-to-
beat exceeds the statutory authority of the PUC.175
The PUC's response to OPUC's contentions was that chapter 39 of
PURA does not create an affirmative consumer right to have service
transferred to the POLR in cases of non-payment nor does it create the
price to beat as a limit on rates POLRs may charge. According to the
PUC, the amended rules violated no specific requirements of PURA and
did not impermissibly interfere with its statutory intent.' 76
Section 39.106 of PURA outlines the POLR's duty to consumers in its
service area and includes the following provision: (g) In the event that a
retail electric provider fails to serve any or all of its customers, the pro-
vider of last resort shall offer that customer the standard retail service
package for that customer class with no interruption of service to any cus-
tomer.177 OPUC argued that this provision prevented the PUC "from
adopting a rule that allows for any potential gap in service between the
time a REP decides to stop providing electricity to a customer and the
time that the customer begins to receive POLR electricity service. 178
OPUC maintained that, under the amended disconnection rule, when a
customer is disconnected upon request of the customer's REP, then the
170. Id. at 231 (referencing 27 Tex. Reg. 8428, 8463-65 (2002) (to be codified at 16 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 25.43) (the "Amended POLR Rule")).
171. Id. (citing Amended POLR Rule § 25.43(h)(2)).









customer will have to apply to the POLR for service, which added a non-
statutory regulatory requirement in addition to the "without interrup-
tion" standard. OPUC argued that the PUC adopted a standard that con-
flicts with the overall purpose and objective of the PURA. 179
The PUC argued, and the court agreed, that Section 39.106(g) of
PURA, at most, "requires the POLR to offer service to disconnected cus-
tomers without interruption, not to guarantee continuous electricity ser-
vice during any conflict with the REP. '180 The court held that the
amended disconnection rule did not violate Section 39.106 because the
POLRs are in a position to offer consumers electric service without inter-
ruption and the same consumer protections of PURA will apply to dis-
connection of service, regardless of whether the POLR or the REP
disconnects the customer.181
OPUC also argued that any rule allowing the POLR rate to be set
above the price to beat violates the PURA. The PUC's position was that
the price to beat applies only to affiliated REPs and is not a general con-
sumer protection. 182 The court upheld the rule, explaining that PURA
requires only affiliated REPs to charge the price to beat during the transi-
tion period and that the amended POLR rate rule is consistent with this
provision because it requires affiliated REPs that serve as POLRs to
charge the price to beat.183
Additionally, OPUC argued that the disconnection rule was not
adopted in conformity with the Administrative Procedure Act's reasoned
justification requirement because the PUC did not expressly address
OPUC's argument concerning the construction of Sections 39.101(b)(4)
and 39.106 of PURA. 184 In regard to this claim, the court found that,
although the PUC did not explicitly address OPUC's comment, the order
adequately explains the PUC's interpretation of the relevant provisions
of PURA and offers a rational justification for its decision to change the
consumer protection rules. The court acknowledged that OPUC's chal-
lenge might raise a technical defect in adopting the order. However, ab-
sent a showing of prejudice to a given right or privilege, a technical defect
is insufficient to invalidate an otherwise valid rule.185
6. Wholesale Transmission Rules
In 1995, the Texas Legislature amended PURA to promote competi-




182. Id. at 235-36.
183. Id. at 236.
184. Id. at 234.
185. Id. at 235 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.035(d) (Vernon 2000)).
186. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 109 S.W.3d 130, 132
(Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (referencing Act of May 28,1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch.




utilities to "provide open access to their transmission facilities."'187 Each
utility was required to provide transmission service at rates and terms
comparable to what it costs the utility to operate its own system. There-
fore, the utilities "had to 'unbundle' the costs associated with their trans-
mission facilities from the costs associated with their generation and
distribution facilities. ' 188 PURA 95 required the PUC to adopt whole-
sale transmission service rules and mandated that utilities file tariffs in
compliance with those rules. 189
"Texas utilities have voluntarily interconnected their regional transmis-
sion networks to form a single grid called the Electric Reliability Council
of Texas (ERCOT). When wholesale power is sold, it is transported over
this ERCOT grid."'190 The PUC adopted rules in 1996 requiring each
ERCOT utility to pay every other ERCOT utility a "facilities charge" for
transmission service, which is comprised of an "impact fee" and an "ac-
cess fee."1 91 The "impact fee made up thirty percent of the facilities
charge and was calculated based upon the distance traveled by the elec-
tricity in the transmission customer's wholesale transactions."' 92 The ac-
cess fee makes up the remaining seventy percent of the facilities charge
and was based on the transmission customer's percentage of use of the
ERCOT grid. The access fee is determined by applying the transmission
customer's percentage of the peak-load quantity of electricity channeled
through the ERCOT grid to the transmission cost of service ("TCOS")
for the entire grid.193
In order to set transmission rates, the PUC commenced individual pro-
ceedings to determine the TCOS for each ERCOT utility. It also initi-
ated a companion generic proceeding to resolve common issues and to set
transmission rates using the costs determined in the individual cases. 194
During the proceedings for individual utilities, the City Public Service
Board of San Antonio ("San Antonio") filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion claiming that the PUC had exceeded its statutory authority in
promulgating the wholesale transmission rules. The Texas Supreme
Court ruled that PURA 95 gave the PUC oversight of wholesale trans-
mission service but not the authority to set initial rates for municipally-
owned utilities such as San Antonio. 195 The supreme court further stated
that the PUC "does not have the power to set wholesale transmission
rates initially, but once a dispute arises, it can either refer the parties to
alternative dispute resolution or it may set a reasonable rate to resolve
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. a 133 (referencing TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 35.006(a), .007(a) (Vernon 1998)).
190. Id. at 132.
191. Id. at 133 (referencing 21 Tex. Reg. 1397 (1996) (to be codified at 16 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 23.67) ("Rule 23.67") and 21 Tex. Reg. 3343 (1996) (to be codified at 16 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 23.70) ("Rule 23.70")).
192. Id. (citing Rule 23.67(g)(1) and 23.70(o)).
193. Id. (citing Rule 23.67(g)).
194. Id. at 134.




During the appeal of San Antonio's declaratory judgment action, San
Antonio also sought judicial review of its TCOS as determined by the
PUC following the contested case proceeding. San Antonio believed that
the PUC had set a TCOS number that was too low. Initially, the district
court upheld the PUC's order regarding San Antonio's TCOS determina-
tion. However, following the Texas Supreme Court's decision on the
transmission rules, the district court conducted a new hearing and vacated
the PUC's order on San Antonio's TCOS on the basis that it exceeded
the PUC's statutory authority. 197
In Public Utility Commission v. City Public Service Board,198 the PUC
appealed the district court's ruling on the PUC determination of San
Antonio's TCOS. The PUC argued that although the TCOS proceedings
were initially conducted as part of a rate-setting scheme, the PUC has
other duties that empower it to determine the TCOS of individual utili-
ties. San Antonio argued, however, that determining a utility's TCOS is
"tantamount to setting its transmission rates."199
The court found that because the PUC admitted that it initiated the
TCOS proceeding for the purpose of setting rates, which was unquestion-
ably beyond the scope of its authority, the PUC's final order on San
Antonio's TCOS must be reversed unless the PUC had some indepen-
dent basis of authority to initiate such a case.200 The PUC maintained
that such authority existed in its responsibilities related to the oversight
of the transmission-service market, and argued that it could not deter-
mine whether San Antonio's rates were reasonable "without first know-
ing the costs associated with its provision of transmission service."' 201 The
agency also contended that its authority to oversee San Antonio's un-
bundling of costs encompasses the authority to determine San Antonio's
TCOS. Rejecting these arguments, the court stated that allowing the
PUC to establish an individual municipal utility's TCOS, separate and
apart from its role of resolving a dispute, and to use that authority to
check reasonableness or conduct its other oversight functions, "bears too
close a nexus to actual rate-setting to withstand scrutiny. ' 20 2 The court
held that an initial determination of a municipal utility's TCOS is tanta-
mount to an initial determination of its wholesale transmission rates, and
reversed the PUC's order.203
196. Id. at 320.
197. San Antonio, 109 S.W.3d at 132.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 136.
200. Id.
201. Id.





In order to construct a transmission line, an electric utility must first
obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity ("CCN") from the
PUC.204 Hammack v. Public Utility Commission2 0 5 upheld a PUC deci-
sion to grant a CCN based on considerations of the needs of the emerging
statewide competitive wholesale market for electricity.20 6
Central Power and Light Company ("Central Power") filed an applica-
tion at the PUC for a CCN to construct a fifty-three-mile long, high-volt-
age transmission line. Several landowners contested this application.
The PUC referred the contested case to the State Office of Administra-
tive Hearings ("SOAH"), where the Administrative Law Judge ("AL")
issued a proposal for decision ("PFD") recommending denial of the ap-
plication. The basis for SOAH's recommendation was "that there was
insufficient evidence demonstrating a public need for the proposed
line. '20 7 SOAH's PFD supported the proposed route for the transmis-
sion line. The PUC conducted its own review of the evidence, however,
and approved the CCN application, stating in its final order that it found
"there was a public need for the line, that existing service was inadequate,
and that granting the CCN would result in probable improvement of ser-
vice or lower costs to consumers. '208
PURA and PUC rules provide that the PUC may grant a CCN only if
it finds that the CCN is necessary for the service, accommodation, conve-
nience, or safety of the public.20 9 The landowners argued on appeal of
the PUC's order that the PUC applied a new legal standard of public
need. The landowners contended that the public need standard em-
ployed by the PUC was inconsistent with the plain meaning of PURA
and in excess of the PUC's statutory authority, resulting in due process
violations. 210 The landowners referred to specific language in the PUC's
order where the agency stated, "a broader view should be taken when
evaluating the issue of need," and argued that the PUC's justification of
its approval of the application was based on a global assertion of the
"needs of the interconnected statewide transmission systems."'2 1' The
landowners claimed that the PUC could consider only the "adequacy of
existing service" and "the effect of granting the certificate on the recipi-
ent of the certificate and any electric utility serving in the proximate
area.,
212
204. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 37.051 (Vernon 1998).
205. Hammack v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, No. 03-02-00232-CV, 2003 WL 22409500 (Tex.
App.-Austin Oct. 23, 2003, no pet. h.).
206. Id. at *1.
207. Id. at *2.
208. Id.
209. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 37.056(a) (Vernon 1998).
210. Hammack, 2003 WL 22409500, at *3.
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 37.056(c) (Vernon 1998)).
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In reaching its conclusion that the proposed line was necessary, the
PUC made numerous findings of fact based on (1) a report issued in Oc-
tober 1999 by the ERCOT Independent System Operator ("ISO"),213
which identified a transmission constraints from South Texas to North
Texas, into the Rio Grande Valley, and in the Corpus Christi area, and (2)
the testimony of an ERCOT representative, which provided that, al-
though construction had begun on a substantial amount of new genera-
tion in the Corpus Christi and Lower Rio Grande Valley areas since
ERCOT's initial report, the new generation would result in potential ex-
port constraints and would not eliminate import constraints during peak
usage. 214 The court found that the PUC reasonably interpreted and ap-
plied the public-need standard by including consideration of customers
and market participants throughout Texas as opposed to only one iso-
lated part of the state. The court held that the PUC had flexibility in
applying the public need standard of PURA and that its application of
the standard to Central Power's request for a CCN was proper in light of
the entire statutory scheme.215
The landowners also maintained that there was no substantial evidence
to support the PUC's grant of the CCN application. The standard for a
substantial evidence review is whether reasonable minds could have
reached the agency's conclusion. 216 The court held that the ISO report
and the testimony of the ERCOT representative clearly provided a rea-
sonable basis in the record for the PUC's determinations of public need
and that the proposed line would result in the probable improvement of
service or lowering of costs to consumers. 217
The landowners argued that the PUC's order concerning the route of
the proposed line did not properly consider the statutory criteria and was
not supported by substantial evidence. In its review of the proposed
route, the PUC considered, among other evidence, a routing study pro-
vided by a consulting firm hired by Central Power. The routing study
considered twenty-eight different routes and evaluated many of the statu-
tory factors in Section 37.056(c) of PURA, including community values,
historical and aesthetic values, parks and recreation areas, and environ-
mental impacts.218 The landowners claimed that the PUC erred by failing
to require Central Power to route the proposed line so that it followed
the existing rights of way. The court determined that the PUC was not
statutorily required to consider the use of existing rights of way in evalu-
213. ERCOT is required to establish an ISO that is responsible for overseeing the
transmission system in Texas. TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.151 (Vernon Supp. 2004). The
ISO's duties include providing an annual report to the PUC identifying existing and poten-
tial transmission and distribution constraints, system needs, and making recommendations
for meeting those needs. Id. § 39.155(b).
214. Hammack, 2003 WL 22409500, at *5.
215. Id. at *7-8.
216. Id. at *8 (citing Texas State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114,
116 (Tex. 1988)).
217. Id. at *8.
218. Id. at *10.
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ating Central Power's proposed route.21 9
The landowners further complained that the PUC's order was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence because Central Power did not officially
propose alternative routes and because the route studied by Central
Power's consultants was not the route approved. The court found that
the routing study was substantial evidence that Central Power considered
numerous alternative routes and that, given the scope of the routing
study, the PUC reasonably concluded that that minor route changes were
not significant enough to have been outside the scope of the environmen-
tal assessment.2 2 0
The landowners complained of a number of procedural irregularities.
The majority of the complaints were allegations of prohibited ex parte
communications in the review of Central Power's application. They also
claimed violations of the Texas Open Meetings Act and that the trial
court erred by sustaining the PUC's claim of privilege regarding certain
documents. 221 The court overruled all of the landowners' points of error
concerning these procedural irregularities. 222
C. NEGLIGENCE
Victoria Electric Cooperative v. Williams22 3 holds that a utility is not
liable for the negligence of its independent contractor hired to construct
and maintain electric distribution lines. In this case, an electric coopera-
tive appealed the judgment in a wrongful death action that found the
utility "liable for negligence in the transportation of utility poles by its
independent contractor. '2 2 4
Victoria Electric is a rural electric cooperative operating under a statu-
torily authorized franchise granted by the City of Victoria to provide elec-
tric service to the city. Victoria Electric entered into a contract with
Urban Electrical Services, Inc. to construct and maintain electrical distri-
bution lines. The accident occurred when a motorist struck a utility pole
that extended past the end of Urban's trailer. Urban settled with the
plaintiffs for $2 million. The jury found actual damages in the amount of
$5.016 million and assigned responsibility fifty percent to Victoria Elec-
tric, twenty-five percent to Urban, and twenty-five percent to the Urban
employee driving the truck.2 2 5 After applying the settlement credit, the
trial court awarded judgment for the remaining balance to Victoria Elec-
tric, imputing Urban's and the driver's negligence to Victoria Electric.
The trial court held that: "(1) Victoria Electric retained the right to con-
trol Urban's activities; (2) Victoria Electric had a non-delegable duty of
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at *12.
222. Id. at *13-16.
223. Victoria Elec. Coop. v. Williams, 100 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003,
pet. denied).




care under the 'peculiar risk' and 'inherently dangerous activity' excep-
tions; and (3) Victoria Electric had a non-delegable duty of care under
the franchise exception. '226 The franchise exception, found in Section
428 of the Restatement of Torts, provides "that a general contractor car-
rying on an activity, 'which can be lawfully carried on only under a
franchise granted by public authority and which involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to others' is liable for negligence of its independent
contractors. 22
7
The court found that the trial court erred in its holding, and reversed
and rendered judgment in favor of Victoria Electric on all claims. In its
discussion of the franchise exception, the court declined to hold "that the
transportation of utility poles is an activity that can only be carried out
under a franchise. '228
D. CONTRACTS
In Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. City of Wharton,229 the defense of
laches was held to be unavailable to Houston Lighting & Power Company
("HL&P") in a dispute that involved the correct interpretation of
franchise-fee agreements between HL&P and the cities of Wharton, Gal-
veston, and Pasadena (the "Cities"). 230
A regulated utility is entitled to recover from its customers all of its
reasonable and necessary operating expenses. Franchise fees are a rea-
sonable and necessary expense and are limited by statute to two percent
of the gross receipts from the sale of electricity. A utility may, however,
give its consent to be charged a higher franchise fee.
In 1957, HL&P entered into franchise agreements with several cities
within its service area. The franchise agreements provided that the cities
would grant to HL&P the right to conduct an electrical lighting and
power business and to use public streets, roads, and easements to erect
poles, lines, towers, and other appurtenances necessary to conduct, dis-
tribute, and sell electricity within each city. In return, HL&P would pay a
franchise fee to each city of $500 annually plus "[four percent] of the
gross receipts for such year, exclusive of receipts for street lighting, re-
ceived by [HL&P] from its electrical lighting and power sales for con-
sumption within the corporate limits of the City. '231 Each city passed an
ordinance that set out the franchise agreement and provided that the
franchise would continue for a term of fifty years beginning January 1,
226. Id. at 326.
227. Id. at 331 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 428 (1977)).
228. Id. at 332.
229. Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. City of Wharton, 101 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
230. Id. at 638-39.




In 1957, most of the services rendered to customers by HL&P were
included in calculating the cost of electricity and were billed to customers
as a portion of the cost of electricity. The franchise fee was not paid on
any miscellaneous charges that were not included in the cost of electric-
ity. Over time, additional charges were excluded from the cost of elec-
tricity, including wholesale sales to other electric utilities, "wheeling, '2 33
customer pay jobs,2 34 pole attachment charges, and miscellaneous ser-
vices. The basis for these exclusions was that the cost of special services
should not be borne by the ratepayer, but by the customer who benefited
from the service. HL&P "did not pay the franchise fee on any costs that
were excluded from the cost of electricity. '235
In 1986, HL&P began "factoring" its accounts. Factoring is a process
by which a business sells to another business, at a small discount, its right
to collect money before the money is paid. [It] reduces the amount of
working capital that a business needs by reducing the delay between the
time of sale and the receipt of payment.
In 1996, fifty cities in the HL&P service area sued the utility for a de-
claratory judgment to construe the franchise-fee agreement and for
breach of the agreement, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The case was
certified as a class action, and the Cities were the class representatives. In
2000, the trial court directed a separate trial on the claims of the Cities
and reserved a ruling on HL&P's motion to decertify the class. 236 The
jury found that: (1) HL&P failed to comply with the franchise agreements
with respect to the customer pay jobs, miscellaneous charges, and the dis-
count on the factored accounts; (2) HL&P committed fraud against the
Cities after the agreements were signed; and (3) HL&P was unjustly en-
riched by use of the agreements and* the unjust enrichment was "commit-
ted" with malice. The jury did not find that HL&P had fraudulently
induced the Cities to enter the franchise agreements. The jury found that
laches applied to the Cities' claims for all seven requested items of recov-
ery. The issue of attorneys' fees was not presented to the jury because
HL&P stipulated that a reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees of forty
percent of the damages awarded in the case to be awarded to the Cities
counsel.237 The jury awarded actual and punitive damages to each of the
Cities for HL&P's breach of the agreement, fraud, and unjust
enrichment.
The trial court "disregarded the fraud and unjust enrichment findings
on the basis that the Cities' claims sounded in contract" and also disre-
232. Id. Only the cities of Wharton and Galveston entered the agreement in 1957. The
City of Pasadena entered the same agreement in 1965 for a period of 50 years beginning
November 1, 1965.
233. Wheeling is other utility companies using HL&P's property.
234. These are special services for which a customer was billed directly.
235. Id. at 636.




garded the laches finding.238 In the final judgment, "the trial court
awarded the contract damages found by the jury in the amount of
$1,175,193.88, plus attorneys' fees of $13,683,181 as [forty percent] of the
damages awarded by the jury. '23 9
In its appeal, HL&P challenge[d] the trial court's award of damages
for breach of the agreement and the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury's findings of breach of the agree-
ment and damages, the trial court's disregard of the jury's laches
finding, and the award of attorneys' fees. The Cities appeal[ed] the
trial court's disregard of the jury's fraud and unjust enrichment find-
ings and the partial summary judgment ruling that sales taxes are not
included in HL&P's gross receipts. 240
HL&P's third point of appeal, the trial court's disregard of the jury's
finding on the affirmative defense of laches, was dispositive of both ap-
peals. Laches would apply "if a city unreasonably delayed asserting its
rights and HL&P made a good faith change of position to its detriment as
a result of the delay."'241 The basis for the trial court's disregard of the
laches finding was the legal theory that laches does not bar a claim by a
governmental unit when the governmental unit is performing a govern-
mental function.242
The Cities contended laches does not apply because (1) their causes of
action are subject to statute of limitations and their suit is to enforce a
statutory right and (2) the Cities were performing a governmental func-
tion. In response to the Cities' first argument, HL&P asserted that the
relevant statute of limitations did not apply to claims by incorporated
cities.243 Section 16.061(a) of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code
states "a right of action of . . . an incorporated city or town ... is not
barred" by any statute of limitations.244 The court held that, because the
statute of limitations in Section 16.061(a) does not apply to the Cities'
claim, laches is an appropriate remedy. The court further held that be-
cause the Cities did not raise any objection to the payments, nor did they
question the payments for well over thirty years, but simply accepted the
payments from HL&P, the defense of laches was available. 245
"The essential elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay in assert-
ing one's legal or equitable rights and (2) a good faith change of position
by another to his detriment because of the delay. ' 246 The court held that
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HL&P's failure to collect [four percent] of its gross receipts on those
revenues challenged by the Cities in this litigation and its inability to
collect the disputed fees from the customers whose purchases would
have generated the fees are some evidence of a change of position
that was detrimental to HL&P because of the delay.2 48
Therefore, the court sustained HL&P's third point of error regarding the
jury's finding on the laches defense.
III. LEGISLATION
A. ELECTRIC UTILITY
1. House Bill 35 (3rd C.S.): Electric Utility Restructuring Oversight
Committee
This Act reconciles differences between House Bill 1948 and Senate
Bill 1418 enacted in the 78th Legislature, Regular Session. It reenacts
and amends provisions of the Utilities Code to clarify the membership of
the Electric Utility Restructuring Oversight Committee, which was cre-
ated to oversee the implementation of Senate Bill 7 enacted in the 76th
Legislature. The committee includes three senators appointed by the
Lieutenant Governor, the chair of the House Committee on Regulated
Industries, and two other House members appointed by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives. The Act provides that one of the three
senators designated by the Lieutenant Governor and chair of the House
Committee on Regulated Industries serve as joint chairs of the oversight
committee. The effective date of this legislation is October 13, 2003.
2. House Bill 1369: Local Registration of REPs
House Bill 1369 amends the Utilities Code to require the PUC to adopt
standard municipal registration requirements for REPs. The rules
adopted by the PUC must be consistent with and no less effective than
federal law and may not require the disclosure of highly-sensitive com-
petitive or trade secret information. The effective date of this Act is Sep-
tember 1, 2003.
3. House Bill 1531: Powers and Duties of Gas and Electric
Corporations
Section 181.001(1) of the Texas Utilities Code was amended to include
a master limited partnership and a limited partnership in the definition of
a corporation. The Act includes in the definition of "corporation" any
entity that is an electric or gas utility, regardless of the form of business
organization. The effective date of the Act is June 20, 2003.
248. Id. at 640.
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4. House Bill 2006: Construction and Maintenance of Facilities Along,
Over, Under, or Across Railroad Right-of-Ways
This Act adds a new subchapter to the Utilities Code concerning con-
struction and maintenance of certain facilities along, over, under, or
across a railroad right-of-way. It authorizes a utility, a common carrier, a
cable operator, or an energy transporter to acquire an easement by emi-
nent domain to use a railroad right-of-way if the entity provides notice to
the railroad and does not unreasonably interfere with railroad operations.
The railroad may require the entity to relocate a facility in the right-of-
way under certain conditions. If the railroad requires the entity to obtain
a right to use the right-of-way, the railroad, upon request in writing, is
required to produce documentation indicating the extent of the railroad's
right, title, or interest in the property, and the entity is required to reim-
burse the railroad for the cost of producing the documentation, not to
exceed $500. If the entity obtains the right to continuously use a railroad
right-of-way through the exercise of eminent domain, the award of dam-
ages due the railroad is the market value of the property plus any dam-
ages to the railroad's remaining property. The Act authorizes the
railroad to recover certain other costs and establishes restrictions on pay-
ment of costs awarded against a railroad in condemnation. A time period
is specified during which the railroad is prohibited from requiring the en-
tity to remove an existing facility if certain conditions are met. The Act
authorizes the entity to pay a one-time fee to obtain an original license or
renew a license for the right to use a railroad right-of-way. The effective
date of the Act is September 1, 2003.
5. House Bill 2548: Construction of Transmission and Distribution
Facilities
Under PURA, it is unclear whether the PUC has the authority to order
a public utility to construct transmission and distribution infrastructure.
House Bill 2548 amends Section 39.203(e) of the Utilities Code to author-
ize the PUC to order the construction of such transmission and distribu-
tion facilities in order to reduce transmission constraints within ERCOT
territory, where such constraints are not being resolved by other specified
means. The Act authorizes the PUC, notwithstanding Section 36.054(a)
of the Utilities Code, to order the inclusion of construction work in pro-
gress in the rate base for transmission and investment required by the
PUC under Section 39.203(e), if the PUC determines that conditions war-
rant such an inclusion. The PUC is also authorized, in granting a CCN, to
consider to the extent applicable the effect that granting the CCN will
have on the state's goal for expansion of renewable energy generating
capacity. The effective date of this legislation is June 18, 2003.
6. Senate Bill 1280: Regulation of Successors to Electric Cooperatives
Previous law exempted electric cooperatives from competition unless a
cooperative's governing body elected to provide customer choice. Senate
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Bill 1280 removes language pertaining to successors of electric coopera-
tives from the definition of "electric cooperative" in Section 11.003 of the
Utilities Code and repeals the special rate provisions applicable to them.
For utilities before September 1, 2003 that were not subject to the chapter
restructuring the electric utility industry, the Act establishes regulatory
oversight by the PUC and authorizes the PUC to establish related sched-
ules and procedures. The effective date of Senate Bill 1280 is September
1, 2003.
B. GAS UTILITY
1. House Bill 1193: Repeal of Annual Gas Utility Report
Section 121.156 of the Texas Utilities Code requiring that the Railroad
Commission make an annual report to the governor on gas utilities is
repealed. This report is no longer required because (1) the funding of
regulatory activities for gas utilities is now performed through the normal
agency budgeting process and (2) regulatory activities and expenditures
are reported through the Railroad Commission's annual statistical and
financial reports. The effective date for this legislation is June 20, 2003.
2. House Bill 1194: Annual Inspection Fee for Natural Gas
Distribution Companies and Master Meter Pipelines
Section 121.211 of the Texas Utilities Code is amended to allow the
Railroad Commission to impose fees on natural gas distribution and
master meter operators to fund the Commission's pipeline safety pro-
gram. Currently, the pipeline safety program is funded through appropri-
ations of general revenue and federal funds. The federal program is a
matching program intended to fund approximately fifty percent of the
cost of the program. The Railroad Commission may assess each investor-
owned and municipally-owned natural gas distribution system an annual
inspection fee that may not exceed fifty cents for each service line re-
ported on the Distribution Annual Report. The Railroad Commission
also may assess each operator of a natural gas master-metered system an
annual inspection fee not to exceed $100 for each master-metered system.
The Act requires each investor-owned and municipally-owned natural gas
distribution company and each natural gas master-meter system operator
to recover as a surcharge to its existing rates the amounts paid to the
Commission under this section. The effective date of the Act is Septem-
ber 1, 2003.
3. House Bill 1575: Cost-Based Transportation Rates for Natural Gas
This Act amends the provisions of the Utilities Code concerning the
requirement that utilities provide natural gas at certain rates to school
districts. It expands the requirement to include all "public retail custom-
ers," which are defined as state agencies, higher education institutions,
public school districts, or political subdivisions. The Act also provides
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that if a municipally-owned gas utility and a public retail customer are not
able to reach an agreement on a contract rate, the rate may be deter-
mined by the relevant regulatory body under the law governing rates and
services. The effective date of this legislation is June 20, 2003.
4. House Bill 2846: Gas Utility Contested Case Hearings
This Act repeals Utilities Code Section 102.006 and Government Code
Section 2003.0491, which required the SOAH to conduct hearings for all
contested case gas utility rate cases that are not conducted by one or
more members of the Railroad Commission of Texas. The effective date
of House Bill 2846 is June 18, 2003.
5. Senate Bill 1271: Incentives to Encourage Gas Utilities to Invest in
New Infrastructure
Currently, a utility must wait until the next rate case to begin recover-
ing on any investments made during the interim between rate cases. Reg-
ulators base rates on the operating expenses of the utilities and a
reasonable return on their investment in facilities. Rate cases are very
expensive to prosecute. This Act allows a utility to start recovering on
new investments in the year following completion of construction. The
effective date of Senate Bill 1271 is September 1, 2003.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases and statutes surveyed in this article should provide attorneys
with a guide to significant developments in utility law, primarily in the
area of deregulation of the electric utility market. The cases demonstrate
that the courts are currently in the process of interpreting the statutes and
rules that are a necessary part of the transition from a regulated market
to a competitive electricity market in Texas.
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